INTRODUCTION
The importation of animals and animal products always involves a degree of disease risk for the importing country. One or several diseases make up this disease risk. Regulatory officials responsible for import programmes require an objective, repeatable and defensible method of assessing these risks. Because multiple disease entities are involved in each import decision, the method must be easy to apply. The risk assessment output must be straightforward and transparent to every party influenced by the import decision. The demand for the importation of a large variety of animal products requires a rapid process. However, more importantly, the method employed must not jeopardize the health status of the importing country.
The exclusion of an animal, animal product or by-product due solely to the presence of a disease in an exporting country is no longer a defensible policy. Application of such a policy would ignore the progress which countries have made in the control and confinement of a disease, and fails to consider the competency of the Veterinary Services in ensuring a safe product. A policy of exclusion ignores the survivability of disease agents within products, the modes of transmission of disease and the means of exposure of the disease in the importing country.
A -the AIU is infected with the agent B -the agent survives commodity handling, treatment or in-transit time C -the commodity is exposed to susceptible animals or man D -the agent is exposed to a portal of entry and is transmissible via a mode of transmission E -the agent induces infection (entry and development or multiplication of the agent) F -the infection induces disease G -disease spreads H -disease is detected. This is a generic set of events, which will differ according to the particular epidemiology of each disease. For example, anaplasmosis and babesiosis involve vectors, cysticercosis involves more than one scenario of exposure related to the definitive and intermediate hosts, and humans may be involved in the transmission of a disease agent from animal or product to animal. In addition, there are many factors involving the agent, susceptible host and environment. Agent factors include the infectivity of the strain of agent, the ability of the agent to produce disease (pathogenicity), the virulence or severity of the disease produced by the agent, the immunogenicity and antigenic stability of the agent, and the viability of the agent in the environment. However, for the present purpose, the list of events is an adequate generalization. On the basis of the available scientific evidence, the probabilities of the events occurring are determined as follows: P(O) = probability that a disease outbreak occurs following the importation of one AIU of the commodity = P(A) x P(BIA) x P(CIAB) x P(DIAnBnC)x... xP(HIAnBnCnDnEnFnG).
In words, these probabilities are as follows: P(A) = probability that the AIU is infected with the disease agent (i.e. the prevalence of the disease in the exporting country) P(BIA) = conditional probability of the survivability of the agent, given that the AIU is infected P(CIAnB) = conditional probability of exposure of the commodity to susceptible animals or humans, given that the AIU is infected and the agent survives in the commodity P(DIAnBnC) = conditional probability that the agent is transmissible via the mode of transmission, given that the AIU is infected, the agent survives in the commodity and the commodity is exposed to susceptible animals or humans etc.
When the importation of a group of n AIUs is considered, P(O) is not obtained as a product of a prior and several conditional probabilities, but through a computation based on the binomial distribution. The assumption is made that infection within the importing country is possible if at least one of the AIUs is infected at the port of entry. P(O) = P(at least one AIU is infected at port of entry and disease is detected) = P(InX) = P(I) x P(XII) where: P(I) = probability that at least one AIU is infected at the port of entry P(XII) = probability that exposure, transmission, infection, disease and disease detection occur, given that at least one AIU is infected at port of entry P(I) = 1 -P(I) = 1 -P(no AIUs are infected at port of entry).
The above events and their probabilities provide the basis for a risk assessment model.
QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT MODEL Unrestricted risk assessment
A simple mathematical model can estimate the probability of a disease risk associated with an importation. This model does not evaluate the magnitude or consequence component of risk and risk assessment. The unrestricted risk estimate (URE) gives the risk associated with the importation of a commodity in the usual commercial form. The word "unrestricted" represents the risk before selecting and applying any risk reduction options, such as diagnostic testing, quarantine and further processing. The URE consists of the product of two probabilities, the probability of agent entry (PAE) and the probability of domestic exposure (PDE).
URE = (PAE) x (PDE) (expression 1).
A risk reduction option reduces either the PAE or the PDE, depending on the point of application. This risk management tool results in the computation of a restricted risk estimate and, depending on the measure, this can dramatically reduce the risk estimate.
Probability of agent entry
The PAE is the probability that at least one AIU of the commodity importation is infected.
In expression 2 below, CF1 represents the country factor, CF2 the commodity factor and n AIUs the number of animal import units:
The part of the expression within parentheses (with the exponent n AIUs) represents the probability that no animal import units are infected.
The PAE for a specified number of animal import units of a particular commodity is identical for all importing countries, while the PDE incorporates the events and their probabilities which exist in the importing country. In all importing countries, these events of exposure and (most certainly) the associated probabilities are different.
Country factor
In the quantitative risk assessment of animal commodity importation, the presence and level of disease in the exporting country are key elements. For very large importations, knowledge of the prevalence of infection in the population of animals of the species concerned is essential. However, for importations of small quantities, knowledge of the prevalence in a single herd, a group of herds, or animals reared using a particular type of husbandry or in a particular region may be more appropriate. Obviously, the country-wide prevalence of a disease may be quite different to the prevalence in herds, groups of herds or regions. However, the OIE disease reporting system is based on country reporting. Importing countries assess the risks associated with an importation based on the disease status of the entire exporting country.
In this paper, examples of the importation of cattle, swine and related products portray the quantitative risk assessment model. The Appendix to this paper represents the Animal Health Statistics and Disease Control Methods table of the OIE publication World Animal Health in 1992 for a fictional country called "Country A", indicating the 1992 animal populations and number of herds and disease statistics for diseases affecting cattle and swine in the country. These data illustrate the numerical computations.
List A diseases (excluding bluetongue)
Calculated prevalence can be determined as a product of the number of outbreaks in the previous 12 months, the average herd size (AHS) and the average duration of infection (ADI) over the denominator of the number of animals in the population:
(No. of outbreaks x AHS x ADI) Calculated prevalence = (expression 3). Population
An outbreak is defined as the occurrence of infection (disease) within a herd; this is less inclusive than the OIE International Animal Health Code definition. The AHS is estimated by dividing the livestock population by the number of herds; these data are reported annually to the OIE. In this example, Country A has an AHS of 271 cattle and 371 swine.
The ADI can be estimated with the epidemiological parameters of the disease in cattle and swine as presented in Table I . The computation of the ADI is based on the following: a) the maximum and minimum duration of the incubation period (IP) b) the maximum and minimum duration of the disease course (DC) over all forms c) the maximum and minimum case fatality rate (CFR) d) the proportion of surviving animals which become latently infected (LIS) e) the maximum duration of latent infection (latent period: LP).
The uniform distribution is used to represent each of these variables (83) . The two distributions of incubation period and disease course are aggregated and integrated with the case fatality and latent infection distributions using the Latin Hypercube simulation of a computer software programme (@Risk, Palisade Corporation, Newfield, New York, United States of America). Where only point estimates are available, these are employed.
The computation may be expressed as follows:
For hog cholera, the number of days post-infection includes the incubation period and the disease course. 
PI = post-infection
In some countries where the disease is enzootic, mortality may be very low and the proportion of latently infected animals may be very high. This is in contrast to epizootic situations where the reverse may occur (i.e. high mortality and low level of latent infection).
The ADI for contagious bovine pleuropneumonia is 120 days (0.33 years) ( Table I ). The reporting of 10 outbreaks of contagious bovine pleuropneumonia during 1992 by Country A (Appendix) gives a calculated prevalence of (10 x 271 x 0.33)/23,212,325 = 3.9 x 10 5 . Similarly, for hog cholera, the 86 reported outbreaks and the ADI of hog cholera of 19 days (0.05 years) gives a calculated prevalence of (86 x 371 x 0.05)/ 26,850,250 = 5.9 x 10-5 .
Obviously, the AHS is a crude statistic based on country-wide estimates of the population of animals and herds for a species. Despite this, the computation of the prevalence based on the number of outbreaks -rather than the reported number of casesprovides a greater level of security for the importing country. Here, a herd outbreak implies that all animals within an outbreak herd are diseased. This security may justify the use of the crude AHS statistic.
List B diseases and bluetongue
A number of these diseases are notifiable in Member Countries of the OIE. Some countries report the number of outbreaks and the number of cases and disease control statistics for these notifiable diseases. However, for the majority of diseases, only a nominal measure of disease prevalence is indicated.
Under the "Occurrence" column of the Animal Health Statistics and Disease Control Methods table of the OIE publication World Animal Health, an indication of either incidence or prevalence is given, depending on the disease. The incidence of rabies cases, bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) cases, anthrax outbreaks or cases, and screwworm outbreaks are often used to subjectively assign a level of disease occurrence. In the same column, knowledge of the serological or abattoir prevalence of other diseases is used to indicate the level of disease occurrence. In order to assess these disease risks, a single numerical measure of disease occurrence is necessary, i.e. prevalence of infection. This permits consistency in the reporting of disease occurrence and the reporting of the levels of infection, and also gives a measure of the level of infection of these diseases on a comparable basis.
The natural history of a disease is influenced by control and eradication programmes instated by the rearer of the animals and by national and sub-national governments. The levels of disease obtained within a herd, region or country are thus often less than would exist if the disease were allowed to spread naturally. In each country, the conditions of control, management, husbandry and environment influence the prevalence of the disease. Using the scientific literature to illustrate the dynamics of the interaction between the disease and control, one can obtain a numerical range of prevalence. This can then be correlated with the reported disease occurrence levels: exceptional, low sporadic, enzootic and high.
The three other disease occurrence designations can be assigned to the "exceptional" level of prevalence. These are as follows:
-suspected but not confirmed -serological evidence and/or isolation of causative agent; no clinical disease -disease exists; distribution and occurrence unknown.
Depending on an evaluation of the Veterinary Services, an importing country may desire to assign a higher level to these less descriptive designations.
The most expeditious and comprehensive source of prevalence information is the publication Animal Disease Occurrence. This is an annual annotated bibliography of the Centre for Agriculture and Biosciences International (CABI) Information Services. For this paper, the most recent six years of this publication, 1986-1991 (28), provided a current and thorough indication of the range of disease prevalence on a global basis.
The criteria for selecting abstracts are as follows: a) Select abstracts (country disease reports, slaughter statistics, and reports of surveys and serological investigations in endemic areas and of control and eradication programmes) where prevalence and the number of animals tested or examined are indicated.
b) Omit studies involving the investigation of disease levels in animals or herds exhibiting or suspected of disease, and in specific breed or husbandry groups.
c) Select only the most recent annual disease reports in any country.
d) Omit any abstracts in which the prevalence is not clearly indicated or where the numbers of animals tested or examined is less than 100. With respect to the latter criterion, for some countries where the animal population is small or the abstract is considered useful because of its geographic origin, these abstracts are used. e) Select abstracts limited to one or two diagnostic methods for any one disease. For example, for anaplasmosis, babesiosis and enzootic bovine leukosis, only abstracts reporting serological findings (seroprevalence) are used, rather than both serological and blood smear survey statistics.
The range of prevalence observed globally is used to indicate the exceptional and the high level of disease prevalence. Points between these two values (quartiles) are correlated to low sporadic and enzootic. Seroprevalence, slaughter prevalence, and prevalence of parasitaemia, lesions and disease represent surrogate measures of prevalence of infection. The extent to which these measures approximate the prevalence of infection in the animal population of a country varies with the disease, the measurement tool and the subset of the population which is surveyed. With some diseases, the level varies considerably with the time of year, related to the climate (specifically the vector season) and husbandry.
The seroprevalence of anaplasmosis, babesiosis, brucellosis and enzootic bovine leukosis may provide a good measure of the true level of infection in cattle over six months of age, whereas the seroprevalence of bluetongue (48) and infectious bovine rhinotracheitis (101) may overestimate the prevalence of infection to a considerable degree. These measures are usually obtained on a definite subset of the population, such as breeding animals, slaughter animals or culled breeding stock. Despite these deficiencies, the surrogate measurements give the best available indication of the true infection level.
With abstracts which report more than one prevalence -usually because of surveys of multiple regions in a country -the highest prevalence value is recorded. Table II presents this correlation of disease occurrence and prevalence levels. 
Trypanosoma brucei T. congolense T. vivax (71, 99)

Theileria parva T. lawrenci T. annulata T. mutans (47, 71)
Babesia bigemina B. bovis B. divergens B. major (23, 71)
Anaplasma marginale A. centrale (23, 71) .
Insufficient data were available for estimation of the prevalence for rabies in swine, Aujeszky's disease, screwworm, trichomoniasis, bovine malignant catarrh and BSE in cattle. Only a few countries reported cases of BSE during 1991. Based on the section of the cattle population over two years of age, annual incidences of between 3.0 x 10-7 and 3.2 x 10 -3 were observed (the upper value represents a 1990 incidence) (5) . Bovine malignant catarrh is sporadic in occurrence, recurring at intervals over many years (89) . This may explain the paucity of reported outbreaks for this disease. Rabies in pigs is rare (8) and Aujeszky's disease in cattle is only seen where cohabitation with swine exists. There is no evidence of inter-bovine transmission of Aujeszky's disease (82) .
Screwworm myiasis caused by Cochliomyia hominivorax occurs in the tropical and semitropical regions of the Americas (34), but few reports of outbreaks or surveys exist in the current literature.
Trichomoniasis of cattle caused by Tritrichomonas foetus is now a rarity in many countries, probably due to the use of artificial insemination (86) . Only a few reports exist in the literature, relating to surveys of bulls.
For anthrax, heartwater, rabies and haemorrhagic septicaemia, the minimum and maximum prevalence are estimated from the annual incidence (cases or deaths) reported by OIE Member Countries. This parameter and the ADI are used to compute the minimum and maximum prevalence (Table III) . Intermediate values are computed as with the other disease entities. Few reports of these diseases exist in the literature. 
a) incidence computed from the annual number of cases and the total cattle population reported for 1991 b) incidence computed from the annual number of deaths and the total cattle population reported for 1991 c) haemorrhagic septicaemia in buffalo was classified as cases in cattle; this overestimates the prevalence in cattle as, in some countries, the majority of cases and deaths occur in buffalo (46) 
Commodity factor
The commodity factor (CF2) is an estimate of the probability of the agent being present at the time of import.
Younger animals are less likely to be infected with most diseases. Certain breeds of animals are less susceptible to infection, such as the Ile de France breed of sheep which exhibit less susceptibility to maedi-visna infection (65) . These determinants (age and breed) have a definite impact on the level of risk associated with an importation. The importation of young animals almost always produces lower risk than with animals from the general population.
Concerning the importation of meat, meat products, milk and milk products -which represent the vast majority of the trade in products of cattle and swine -other determinants exist. These are related to the epidemiology of the disease, the agent, the product properties and the processing involved in preparation of the product. Transmission and agent survival studies indicate the presence or absence of agents in various products, and the CF2 and its component determinants are deduced from the reported findings.
The OIE Lists A and B diseases of cattle and swine which are generally of concern with product importation are foot and mouth disease, swine vesicular disease, hog cholera, African swine fever, anthrax, echinococcosis, bovine brucellosis, bovine tuberculosis, Q fever, bovine spongiform encephalopathy, cysticercosis, enzootic bovine leukosis, transmissible gastroenteritis and trichinellosis.
Sources of information
The following represents sources of information which are useful for determining the CF2 associated with the importation of meat and milk and related products.
Meat and meat products
Reviews -foreign animal disease agent survival in animal products (13) -viruses in products of food animals (14,18) -meat and meat product importation (72) .
Foot and mouth disease
Reviews -persistence of foot and mouth disease virus (FMDV) in animals, animal products and the environment (36) .
Epidemiology
-persistence of FMDV in beef and pork (93) -presence and persistence of FMDV in bovine skin (53) -sites of virus persistence and multiplication in the carrier animal (24) -sites of pre-viraemic localization and multiplication (27) .
Products and processing
-survival of FMDV in fresh and stored beef carcass meat (37,38) -inactivation of FMDV by pH and temperature changes (7) -FMDV and meat processing (92) -thermal processing at 69°C (75) -international trade from FMD-infected countries (22) -electrical stimulation on pH and survival of FMDV in meat and offals (3) -Parma ham (77) -ingredient effects on the thermal inactivation of FMDV in formulated, comminuted meat products (20) -total caloric input of a thermal process for ground beef (19) -Italian salami (84) -effects of heat, irradiation and pH on infectivity (69) -persistence of FMDV on meat-packaging materials (54) -persistence of FMDV in meat products (93) -effects of heat, freezing/thawing, salt/citric acid curing and curing salts on FMDV infectivity (61) .
Hog cholera
Epidemiology -transmission and pathogenesis (42, 58, 106) . 
Products and processing
African swine fever
Epidemiology
-transmission and pathogenesis (108) .
Products and processing
-dried salami and pepperoni sausages, brined hams, heated hams (74) -Parma ham (77) -thermal processing at 69°C (75) .
Swine vesicular disease
Epidemiology -pathogenesis (60).
Products and processing
-survival of the agent in carcass meat (44) -dry salami, pepperoni sausage, intestinal casings, cooked canned hams (13, 73, 74) -Parma ham (76) -survival of the agent in organs, tissues, sausages, salami and mortadella (52) -thermal processing at 69°C (75) .
Anthrax
Epidemiology -pathogenesis (23)
-survival of organisms and spores in the environment, meat, milk, hair, wool and hides (81).
Products and processing
-bone meal (43) .
Echinococcosis (Echinococcus granulosus)
Epidemiology -transmission and source of infection (1).
Cysticercosis (Cysticercus bovis and C. cellulosae)
Epidemiology
-zoonotic cycle (6, 64, 96) -human health and livestock production (49) .
Bovine spongiform encephalopathy
Epidemiology -transmission, tissue distribution (4, 5, 67) .
Products and processing
-restrictions on trade and use of meat-and-bone meal (67) -non-detectable infectivity in carcass meat (5).
Trichinellosis
Epidemiology
-zoonotic cycle (1, 97) .
Products and processing
-inactivation of the trichinellosis parasite (103).
Transmissible gastroenteritis
Epidemiology -distribution of virus (57) -persistence of virus in lung and small intestine (104) -oral transmission using carcass meat of acutely-infected swine (35, 50) .
Milk and milk products
Reviews -foreign animal disease agent survival in animal products (13) -viruses in products of food animals (14) .
Foot and mouth disease
Reviews ( 
Q fever
Epidemiology
-transmission and source of infection (1).
Products and processing
-high-temperature, short-time milk pasteurization (2).
Bovine brucellosis
Epidemiology
-transmission and pathogenesis (1, 23) .
Products and processing
-survival of Brucella abortus in butter, cream, milk and milk products (81) .
Bovine tuberculosis
Epidemiology
Products and processing
-survival of Mycobacterium bovis in milk and milk products (81) .
Enzootic bovine leukosis
Epidemiology -transmission and pathogenesis (105) .
Products and processing
-pasteurization (33) .
Bovine spongiform encephalopathy
Products and processing
-non-detectable infectivity in milk (5).
Animal import units
The number of units imported significantly influences the PAE. As the number of AIUs is the exponent of expression 2, this has the most significant effect on the PAE. As the importation increases in quantity, it is obvious that the chance of disease risk increases.
A single animal of any species represents one AIU for the species. An embryo or a unit of semen can be considered as one AIU. Meat, meat products and other products of animal origin are given a weight equivalency (in kg) for one AIU. The number of AIUs represents the expected number of animals which have contributed to the total weight of the importation.
The yield in kg of carcass organs, carcass portions, glands, hides and by-products varies considerably. Breed, sex, age, live weight at slaughter and the amount of trimming of fatty tissue and skin all influence the weights of carcass and offal. The difference in weight between fresh or frozen and preserved products is often substantial. For instance, salt curing of cattle hides gives a net decrease of approximately 15-20%, primarily due to water loss (90) . The trimming and preparation of carcass portions gives a wide variation in the weight of the fresh or frozen product. A pork ham may exist in four forms (87) Tables IV to VIII illustrate some of the variability encountered with organs, hides and carcass portions of cattle and swine. In Table VIII , the carcass portions of swine are representative of an 80 kg carcass and hence a wider range of portion weights will be seen with the range of carcass weights encountered at slaughter. In estimating the number of animals which have contributed to a certain weight of product, the product must be fully described with regard to the average individual weight or the range of weights for the individual product. This more accurately estimates the animal contribution than using the fresh weights. The individual portion weight of carcass halves and carcass portions can usually be considered as twice the weight in kg for a single animal contribution. If the average weight of a pork ham product is 10 kg, the contribution per animal is 20 kg (two hams), representing one AIU. If the range in weights for this product is 6.4-13.6 kg, one could use the lower value; 12.8 kg would therefore represent one AIU. The latter method overestimates the number of AIUs contributing to the overall weight of the importation. Table IX indicates the PAE for four commodities being imported from Country A. The CF2 is essentially zero for all commodity/disease combinations where values are not indicated. The computation of the PAE is based on expression 2 above. A PAE of 1.00 indicates that there is 100% probability that at least one AIU is infected at the port of entry. Tables Xa and Xb expand the computations for two disease risks associated with the importation of a boneless ham product and the importation of breeding cattle.
Probability of agent entry computed
For the importation of live cattle, the CF2 is considered to be 1.00. This is equivalent to saying that the age group from which the importation originates has no influence on the population prevalence. However, with the importation of beef half-carcasses and livers, the CF2 for some of the disease risks is negligible, and zero values can be employed. This is due to the pathogenesis and predilection sites of the agent, as observed with contagious bovine pleuropneumonia (91), paratuberculosis (32) and bovine genital campylobacteriosis (23, 86) . With respect to the rabies agent in carcass meat importation, the virus is assumed to be potentially present, although it has never been isolated from meat (9) . The CF2 for rabies virus in liver importation is assumed to have zero value. The pathogenesis and mode of transmission of atrophic rhinitis (associated with toxigenic strains of Pasteurella multocida) preclude pork as a source of infection (23) .
Expected weight range of fresh/frozen pork portions of an 80 kg carcass (87)
Type of portions Weight range (kg)
With respect to the products of cattle and swine, it is understood that there is a time delay -due to processing, packaging, storage, shipping and distribution -before the target species are exposed in the importing country. This means that some diseases which can be transmitted directly by contact with infected excretions and secretions do not present a risk, because the fragility and survival time of the agent in the product is limited. This is the case with leptospirosis agents (81) and rabies virus (9) . Number of animal import units (n AIUs) 500,000 kg/7 kg minimum weight per ham x 2 hams per pig = 35,714 AIUs
Probability of agent entry 1 -(1-country factor x commodity factor)n AIUs = l-(l-[5.9 x 10-5 x 1 x 10-8 ]) 35 ,714 = 2.1 x 10-8 (probability that at least one animal import unit of the importation is infected) Of course, this very low risk on such a large annual importation applies only to this specific product. High levels of HC virus have been found in carcass muscle following intranasal inoculation (109) . The viability of HC virus for other ham products depends on the processing and hence the commodity factor is based on the inactivation of the HC virus through the usual processing of the product (13, 62, 74, 100) . Thermal inactivation of HC virus occurs after 15 min at 69°C (58)
Trichinellosis
Country factor Exceptional level of occurrence correlated to a prevalence from Table II  = 
Probability of domestic exposure
The PDE represents the likelihood that the commodity is exposed to animals or humans in the importing country and that agent transmission, infection, disease, disease spread and disease detection occur. The scenarios for the exposure of a particular commodity to animals and humans -and simultaneously the exposure of the agent to a portal of entry for one or more species which are hosts of the disease -can be numerous. The modes of transmission of the disease dictate the exposure possibilities with different commodities.
Probability of disease agent entry associated with the importation of 500,000 kg of 400-day-aged boneless pork ham weighing 7-9 kg, prepared according to the Parma ham process 
Disease risk Factors
Commodity factor
Consider age and breed of cattle as not influencing level of disease in the importation = 1.0 (representing apparently healthy incubatory carrier animals) (91) Number of animal import units (n AIUs) 1,000 AIU Probability of agent entry 1 -(1 -country factor x commodity factor)n
1,000 = 6.0 x 10-2 (probability that at least one animal import unit of the importation is infected)
Bovine brucellosis Country factor
Exceptional level of occurrence correlated to the prevalence from Table II  = 1,000 = 1.0 x l0-2 (probability that at least one AIU of the importation is infected)
With the importation of animals, the PDE is considered absolute, and a value of 1.00 is used. The fact that certain animals are destined for zoos, laboratory facilities, urban areas and destinations remote from other animal populations has to be considered.
The importation of milk, milk products, meat, meat products and other products of cattle and swine involves the potential importation of disease agents. However, the modes of disease transmission dictate the possibility (probability) of transmission within the importing country. Table XI shows the OIE Lists A and B diseases which can be transmitted through the importation of cattle and swine and some related products. Vehicle-borne transmission occurs only if a susceptible target species consumes an infectious dose or a viable parasite in the infected commodity. Man is the most common target species, as many of the products are imported for human consumption. The discarding of meat scraps to swine for consumption places swine prominently as a target species. For products, the diseases which are transmitted only by direct transmission (contagious bovine pleuropneumonia, rinderpest, Rift Valley fever, leptospirosis, rabies) and only by vectors (bluetongue, heartwater, anaplasmosis, babesiosis) have a PDE approaching zero. The vector-borne diseases can be introduced into an importing country if the commodity is live cattle and if competent vectors exist at the time of importation, or if the commodity is a product (e.g. fresh hides) infested with living and infected ticks.
Echinococcosis, cysticercosis and trichinellosis may be transmitted via vehicle-borne transmission in which humans and animals consume carcass meats and organs infected with viable parasites. Live animals which are imported may be the source of these agents after slaughter.
The many scenarios which exist within the importing country for the exposure of a commodity and agents contained in the commodity must be elaborated for any risk assessment. The existence of potentially multiple agents in any commodity adds to this complexity. However, if the PAE is essentially zero for some diseases and the PDE is zero for other diseases, the complexity diminishes.
Using historical importation statistics
Multiple scenarios exist for the exposure of pork and the agent of trichinellosis to both humans and swine, as well as wild fauna, through the importation of pork from a country infected with swine trichinellosis. The exposure of viable Trichinella spiralis parasites to man is related to customs and cultural practices of the importing country with regard to the cooking of pork for human consumption. The frequency of consumption of inadequately-cooked pork by the human population in general, or by particular ethnic and cultural groups within a country, is often not known.
However, there may be historical information on the number of human cases of trichinellosis associated with pork consumption, the quantity of carcass pork imported from another country, and the approximate level of trichinellosis infection in the swine population of the exporting country. If no cases of human trichinellosis were observed over the past 10 years, during which time 20 million kg of frozen carcasses and half-carcasses of pork were imported annually from Country A, both the PDE and the URE are minimal. This is determined by considering that 50 kg represents one AIU and that, therefore, over the 10 years approximately 4 million AIUs of the product were imported. Of these, approximately 160,000 were infected with trichinellosis, based on Country A reporting an enzootic level of trichinellosis in swine and the prevalence level to which this correlates from Table II (4 x 10- 2 ). A mean frequency of exposure can then be estimated, using the beta statistical distribution (83) with the following parameters:
a^=x + 1 and a 2 = n + 1 -x.
The mean of the above distribution is calculated as follows:
The standard deviation is equal to:
The "most likely" value for the above beta distribution is the so-called "mode" = x/n. Therefore, if one wants to approximate the beta distribution by a triangular distribution (83) , the three parameters for the latter would be as follows: ifx>0 a = max(0,µ-3a), b =x/n and c = µ + 3a x + 1 if x = 0 a = max(0, µ -3a), b = and c = µ + 3a.
In this example, where x = 0 and n = 160,000, the beta distribution parameters compute a mean of 6.3 x 10 -6 and a standard deviation of 6.3 x 10 -6 . Since the number of human cases of trichinellosis is zero, the minimum, most likely and maximum parameters for the triangular distribution are 0, 6.3 x 10 -6 and 2.5 x 10 -5 , respectively. Converting the triangular input into a cumulative distribution function (80) using the Latin Hypercube simulation of @Risk, we obtain a 99% probability that the frequency of exposure and human infection is less than 2.3 x 10 -5 . This gives the best estimate of the URE, although it is expressed as a probability of a frequency rather than a simple probability value.
Using information on animal and human population statistics and practices
The exposure of swine to viable Trichinella spiralis parasites may involve a number of scenarios, such as the following: a) the discarding of uncooked meat scraps from households to swine b) the consumption of uncooked pork at garbage disposal sites by either domestic or feral swine c) the consumption of uncooked pork in swine-rearing operations which rely on the feeding of hotel and restaurant food waste.
Some importing countries may have complete compliance with animal health regulations regarding exclusion of swine from garbage disposal sites, and the licensing and adequate cooking of food waste in garbage-feeding swine herds. If this is the case, these scenarios do not have to be considered. In other countries, the control of these activities may be limited and the frequency of exposure of swine to uncooked pork through these scenarios is completely unknown. As with the human exposure scenario for trichinellosis detailed above, the most appropriate means of answering this is through historical importation information. One can even consider such information from other importing countries which have similar exposure scenarios and national animal health compliance levels, and similar customs and cultural practices. For the scenarios involving the feeding of meat scraps to swine, a probability could be based on the division of the total number of farms reporting the presence of swine by the total number of households in the country, and multiplying this by the proportion of producers which could be expected to feed household table scraps to swine. Here, a farm is assumed to represent a household, although this probably exaggerates the number of households which rear swine in any country.
The following provides an illustration of this method, using actual population statistics. In Canada, there are 10,018,265 households, of which 2,129,365 are designated as rural households. A rural household is considered to be any household outside an urban area. An urban area is defined as a continuous built-up region with a population concentration of greater than 1,000 and a population density of greater than 400 per km 2 (1991 Census Data, Statistics Canada).
A total of 29,592 farms report owning one or more pigs (1991 Census of Agriculture, Statistics Canada). If each farm is considered to be a household, the proportion of Canadian households which rear swine is 0.003. The upper limit of the proportion of producers which would be expected to feed household table scraps to swine could be taken as the proportion of the number of small swine producers to the total number of swine producers. The agriculture census data for Canada indicate that there are seven herd size groupings, of which the smallest is 1-77 swine. There are 14,907 farms in this group (1991 Census of Agriculture, Statistics Canada). As a proportion of the total number of farms reporting the presence of swine, this represents 0.50. Therefore, the PDE for this specific scenario in Canada is 0.003 x 0.50 = 1.5 x 10 -3 .
For the other scenarios, the means of estimating the probabilities has to be considered. If the above probability estimate for the exposure scenarios through swine appears reasonable, similar methods could be used, based on livestock and human population census data. Obviously, these probability estimates of domestic exposure will be different for each country. Different scenarios will exist, and livestock and population census data will give different proportions.
MacDiarmid (72) presented a mathematical expression employed by the Australian Bureau of Rural Resources in an assessment of the risk associated with the importation of pork from countries infected with transmissible gastroenteritis (TGE) of pigs. In this expression, the probability (T) of TGE being introduced is related to the probability (p) that a piece of pork contains the virus and the number of occasions (n) that raw pork is fed to pigs. The expression can be stated as follows: T = l-(l-p) n and for T <l/2,500, T = pn.
Here, p = ivs and n = hmft, where:
-i is the probability that a pig was infected with TGE virus at the time of slaughter -v is the proportion of infected pork still containing infective virus when marketed -s is the proportion of imported pork among all the fresh pork sold -h is the number of small pig herds in Australia -m is the number of unprocessed pork meals eaten per year -f is the proportion of pig farmers who feed scraps to pigs -t is the proportion of occasions on which the scraps contain raw pork. Therefore, T represents the URE.
Whether the estimation of the PDE or URE is conducted through historical importation statistics or using a computation based on animal and human population statistics, the facts supporting the method must be fully documented. The use of importation statistics in which there was no occurrence of disease represents fairly concrete information on the safety of the importation, providing that sufficient data are available. When these data are lacking or insufficient, other methods similar to the above may be used to obtain the probabilities associated with each scenario. In general, only the most likely scenario is investigated in such a manner. If an unacceptable URE is obtained, no other scenarios need to be elaborated, as the importation would be rejected; however, if the most likely scenario gives rise to a low URE, all scenarios for that commodity/agent combination should be evaluated.
CONCLUSION Summary of steps for the risk assessment model
The steps used in the model may be summarised as follows: a) For OIE List A diseases except bluetongue:
i) Obtain the most recent twelve months of statistics on the number of outbreaks from the OIE publications World Animal Health or Bulletin.
ii) Obtain the population statistics for the particular species from World Animal Health. Compute the AHS by dividing the animal population by the number of herds for the species concerned.
iii) Obtain the ADI (in days) of the OIE List A diseases from Table I ii) Obtain from Table II of this paper the upper prevalence value for the disease occurrence obtained in b) i) above, i.e. the assigned prevalence. c) Depending on the disease risk, employ either the calculated prevalence or the assigned prevalence as the CF1 in expression 2 above. d) Be aware of any recent changes in the disease status of the exporting country by referring to the weekly OIE publication Disease Information. e) Determine the CF2 relating to the properties of the commodity. Where the processing of a product effectively eliminates the disease agent, an extremely small probability value (e.g. 10 -8 ) can be employed. Where there is little influence, a probability value of 1.0 can be employed. Document, with literature references, the determinants considered and the value employed for the CF2.
f) State the number of AIUs, based on the description of the importation. Document, for product importations, the basis of the selection of a weight equivalency. g) Compute the PAE (expression 2) based on the two probabilities, CF1 and CF2, and the number of AIUs. This expression gives the probability that at least one AIU of the importation is infected.
h) Determine the PDE, based on the epidemiology of the disease, the nature of the commodity, the relevant human and animal demographics and population statistics, customs and cultural practices, animal health legislation and compliance levels, and statistics on the quantity of historical importation without disease. i) Calculate the URE (expression 1 above). j) Evaluate the consequences (economic, social, political, environmental) associated with the importation. k) Present both the URE(s) and the associated consequences to the decision-maker.
Note : A multiple species disease may exist and be reported in another species. In this situation, an assessment of the Veterinary Services and the surveillance and animal health monitoring programmes may satisfy the importing country that the absence of the disease in the species of concern is a fact rather than a reporting deficiency.
Present and future models
The risk assessment model uses the available animal health and disease statistics to assess the risks associated with the importation of a specific quantity of animals or animal products. The correlation of the nominal level of disease occurrence reported for List B diseases and bluetongue may not be valid at present. Detailed guidelines do not exist for the reporting of the level of occurrence of these diseases, and until such guidelines become available this will remain a major deficiency of the model. For the reporting of List A diseases, the definition of "outbreak of disease" for the OIE reporting system indicates that more than one herd could be involved in a single outbreak. This risk assessment model uses the definition of "herd outbreak", which is more useful, as it portrays the extent of the disease. The present reporting system definition is useful epidemiologically. This difference in definitions represents another deficiency of the model.
Although this model uses prevalence of infection in the entire population of the exporting country (based on the statistics of the OIE reporting system), it is envisaged that prevalence of infection in herds and regions of a country may be future statistics of the reporting system and a model appropriate for these data would therefore be required. The present model benefits an exporting country which has almost eradicated a disease. That is, it assesses the risk of importation based on the prevalence rather than just the presence of the disease. In future models based on the prevalence of infection in herds, this same exporting country would be in a much better standing for the export of commodities. Disease does localize in herds and in regions, and it is somewhat unfair to imply that the population at risk is that of the entire country. Nonetheless, the model has to use whatever data are available and, more importantly, provide security for the importing country.
This risk assessment permits the decision-making aspect of risk management to proceed. Foremost, the risk assessment documents the basis for a decision and provides for a scientific exchange between regulatory officers of both the importing and exporting countries.
Point estimates are obtained with this risk assessment model. An importing country may wish to conduct a sensitivity analysis on the computation of the URE. This may involve utilizing a range of CF1 and CF2 values as well as a range of variables in the estimation of the PDE. 
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